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Good Faith in Calling Demand Notes and in
Refusing to Extend Additional Financing
WILLIM H. LAWRENCE* AND
ROBERT D. WILSON**
Two recent cases have drawn considerable national attention to the issue
of whether the standard of good faith governs a lender's decision to
terminate financing under loans callable upon demand. Centerre Bank of
Kansas City v. Distributors, Inc.' concerns the call of a demand note, while
K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co.2 addresses a lender's refusal to extend
further credit under a loan obligation that could be called upon demand.
Both cases involved awards of seven and one-half million dollars, thereby
enhancing the attention directed toward them. In addition, the practicing
bar is currently focusing extensively on several aspects of lender liability.3
The good faith standard is one of several theories lawyers advance with
increasing frequency in litigation over the proper bounds of lender activity. 4
The Centerre and K.M.C. cases have assumed paramount positions in that
debate.
Several reasons suggest that a critical analysis of the role of good faith
in this context should be undertaken. The two cases themselves reach
different conclusions, and unfortunately, both courts commit serious errors.
Despite these faulty analyses, other courts and commentators have demon-
strated an uncritical willingness to reach similar results.5 These errors,
* Professor of Law, University of Kansas. J.D., 1972, B.A., 1966, University of Oregon.
** J.D., 1988, University of Kansas.
1. Centerre Bank of Kansas City v. Distributors, Inc., 705 S.W.2d 42 (Mo. Ct. App.
1985).
2. K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1985).
3. Current interest in lender liability is evidenced by the efforts of the Division for
Professional Education of the American Bar Association. That organization has sponsored a
number of national seminars on the topic and has published a three volume set of materials.
See 1-3 AmucAN BAR AssocrAnioN, EMERGING THEosms or LENDER LABxrY (H. Chaitman
ed. 1985). In addition to the issue of good faith, the scope of lender liability issues encompasses
a wide variety of theories concerning lender control of debtors and the application of civil
RICO to lender activities. See id.
4. See generally Warren, Good Faith Under the Uniform Commercial Code, in 1 AmiEmcAN
BAR AssocirroN, EMERGING THroRias or LENDER LmA'xrrry 57 (H. Chaitman ed. 1985).
5. As is discussed below, infra notes 32-39 and accompanying text, the Centerre opinion
is based in part upon the holding of a prior opinion, Fulton Nat'l Bank v. Willis Denny Ford,
Inc., 154 Ga. App. 846, 269 S.E.2d 916 (1980). See also Allied Sheet Metal Fabricators, Inc.
v. Peoples Nat'l Bank of Wash., 10 Wash. App. 530, 536 n.5, 518 P.2d 734, 738 n.5, cert.
denied., 419 U.S. 967 (1974). The Centerre case undoubtedly has received the most attention,
however, because of the $7.5 million award. For cases subsequent to these decisions, see Reid
v. Key Nat'l Bank of Southern Me., Inc., 821 F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1987); In re Red Cedar Constr.
Co., 63 B.R. 228, 238 n.7 (Bankr. Mich. 1986) (dicta); Flagship Nat'l Bank v. Gray Distribution
Sys., Inc., 485 So. 2d 1336, 1340, 1341 (Fla. Ct. App. 1986); Carrico v. Delp, 490 N.E.2d
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therefore, should be corrected. Critical analysis of these cases is all the
more relevant since until recently applicability of good faith performance
and enforcement has gone virtually unnoticed in the context of commercial
paper and secured financing.6 The current interest in wholesale recodifica-
tions of commercial law in general7 and the recurring indications of dis-
pleasure with the codification of the good faith principle in particular
increase the importance of assessing these cases.8
Section I of this Article addresses the applicability of the good faith
standard to calls of demand instruments and to refusals of additional
financing under loan obligations callable upon demand. This section analyzes
extensively the Centerre court's error in holding that the good faith standard
is inapplicable to the call of a demand note. 9 Section II focuses on how
the standard applies. It analyzes the approach codified in the Uniform
Commercial Code (the Code) and suggests ways to break beyond some of
the'undesirable restraints of the codified scheme. The subjective standard
drafted in the Code is excessively restrictive. The Article uses a combination
of statutory construction techniques, argument by analogy, analysis of
drafting objectives, and reasonable commercial practices to develop ration-
ales by which to extend an objective standard of good faith to these cases.
I. DoEs Tim GOOD FAMTH STANDARD APPLY?
Section 1-203 of the Uniform Commercial Code imposes a pervasive good
faith standard on transactions that come within the scope of any of the
972 (Ill. App. 1986); Shaughnessy v. Mark Twain State Bank, 715 S.W.2d 944, 950, 953 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1986) (dictum). For commentators, see 5 R. ANDERSON, UNIFORM CO n0RcIAL CODE
§ 3-122:4, at 387, § 3-122:16, at 392 (3d ed. 1984); 2 Bender's Uniform Commercial Code
Service § 5.02[2], at 5-8 to 5-9 & n.9 (F. Hart & W. Wilier 1988) [hereinafter F. Hart & W.
Willier]; Note, Negotiable Promissory Notes Containing Time and Demand Provisions: The
Need for Consistent Interpretation, 19 GA. L. REv. 717, 722, 733-34, 738-39 (1985). See also
McDonnell, Problems with Notes: Accrual, Acceleration, and Suretyship, 18 U.C.C. L.J. 40,
41-42 (1985) (cites opinions but does not comment on them).
6. The focus has been on good faith as an element to achieve holder-in-due-course status
and on good faith as an element in a bank's decision to pay an instrument. See infra notes
87-96 and accompanying text.
7. See Mooney, Introduction to the Uniform Commercial Code Annual Survey: Some
Observations on the Past, Present, and Future of the U.C.C., 41 Bus. LAW. 1343, 1353-55
(1986).
8. See Burton, Good Faith Performance of a Contract Within Article 2 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 67 IowA L. RFv. 1 (1981); Farnsworth, Good Faith Performance and
Commercial Reasonableness Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 30 U. Cm. L. REv. 666
(1963); Hillman, Policing Contract Modifications Under the UCC: Good Faith and the Doctrine
of Economic Duress, 64 IowA L. Ray. 849 (1979); Summers, "Good Faith" in General
Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. Rav.
195 (1968). But see Gillette, Limitations on the Obligation of Good Faith, 1981 DuKE L.J.
619.
9. Centerre, 705 S.W.2d 42.
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articles of the Code. Section 1-203 provides that "[e]very contract or duty
within this Act imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance or
enforcement." 10 Since a negotiable promissory note falls within the scope
of Article 3 on commercial paper," and a lending agreement entered into
pursuant to a security agreement comes within the scope of Article 9 on
secured transactions, 12 all parties to these transactions are required to
perform their contract obligations and duties in good faith. Further, they
are permitted to enforce the contract obligations and duties of other parties
only in good faith.
The Missouri appellate court in Centerre Bank of Kansas City v. Distrib-
utors, Inc.3 held that the obligation of good faith does not apply to a
lender's decision to call a demand note.' 4 The court set aside a jury verdict
in favor of the borrower on the grounds that, as a matter of law, the lack
of good faith is not relevant to the call of a demand note." The court's
ruling grossly misconstrues the Code on the question of applicability of the
good faith standard.
Although the Centerre court recognized the codification of section 1-203,
it ruled that this section was inapplicable because "[t]he imposition of a
good faith defense to the call for payment of a demand note transcends
the performance or enforcement of a contract . . . . "16 Without explaining
its rationale as to why the call of a demand note does not relate to
performance or enforcement, the court applied an unjustifiably restrictive
construction to the codified terms. The court apparently did not appreciate
the underlying policy of section 1-203.
The good faith standard in section 1-203 is limited to contract "perform-
ance or enforcement' 7 in order to preclude its applicability to contract
negotiations."' The good faith obligation is imposed by law irrespective of
10. U.C.C. § 1-203 (1978). "This section sets forth a basic principle running throughout
this Act." U.C.C. § 1-203 comment (1978).
11. U.C.C. § 3-104(1), (2)(d).
12. U.C.C. § 9-102(1)(a).
13. 705 S.W.2d 42 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
14. "Instruments payable on demand include those payable at sight or on presentation and
those in which no time for payment is stated." U.C.C. § 3-108 (1978).
15. Centerre, 705 S.W.2d at 48, 55.
16. Id. at 48 (emphasis added).
17. The Second Restatement of Contracts limits it similarly: "Every contract imposes upon
each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement."
RESTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF CoNrRACrs § 205 (1979). For commentary on the Restatement
provision, see Summers, The General Duty of Good Faith-Its Recognition and Conceptuali-
zation, 67 CORNELL L. REv. 810 (1982).
18. But see Dugan, Good Faith and the Enforceability of Standardized Terms, 22 Wm. &
MARY L. REv. 1 (1980) (develops argument for application of contractual good faith constraints
to standardized terms). Professor Summers has proposed amending the section to include
negotiations. Summers, supra note 8, at 215 n.73, 218.
1988]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
the contracting parties' actual intent. 9 In our legal system the obligation
arises from the contract itself. As a contractual obligation, however, it
cannot apply before the contract is formed.20 Other legal systems do extend
good faith obligations to contract negotiations, 2' but their extension as a
basis for pre-contractual liability raises conceptual difficulties within our
system. 22 The codification of section 1-203 explicitly recognizes this limitation
by precluding its applicability to contract negotiations.
The Centerre court's ruling that calling a demand note transcends per-
formance and enforcement resembles the argument advanced in cases liti-
gating dealership termination clauses. The franchisers have contended that
the termination clause can be exercised without regard to good faith because
its exercise is neither performance nor enforcement, but rather termination.23
With only a few exceptions, 24 this argument generally, and properly, has
not succeeded.25 Although termination ends the basis to continue the contract
19. The obligation of good faith cannot be disclaimed by agreement between the parties.
U.C.C. § 1-102(3) (1978).
20. The policing powers of the courts, invoked through doctrines such as fraud, duress,
and capacity to contract, enable judges to invalidate contracts that may have been formed
with one of the parties acting in bad faith. Those powers are very different, however, from
the ability to determine that a party has breached an implied obligation of good faith and is
therefore liable for the damages occasioned.
21. German law, for example, recognizes the doctrine of culpa in contrahendo, meaning
fault in negotiating, which provides that "damages should be recoverable against the party
whose blameworthy conduct during negotiations for a contract brought about its invalidity or
prevented its perfection." Kessler & Fine, Culpa in Contrahendo, Bargaining in Good Faith,
and Freedom of Contract: A Comparative Study, 77 HARv. L. R.v. 401, 402 (1964).
22. A few courts, particularly in franchise cases, have granted recovery based on the
reliance interest against a negotiating party who has not extended an offer. See, e.g., Hoffman
v. Red Owl Stores, 26 Wis. 2d 683, 133 N.W.2d 267 (1965). Most courts, however, have
avoided imposing a contract duty to negotiate in good faith. Tort theory has provided more
conceptually appropriate remedies in this area. For excellent discussions of the limits of
contract theory in this context, see E. FAMRswoRTH, CoNfiAcTs 187-92 (1982); Summers,
supra note 8, at 220-32, 256-62. But cf. Holmes, A Contextual Study of Commercial Good
Faith: Good-Faith Disclosure in Contract Formation, 39 U. PrrT. L. REv. 381 (1978) (principles
of contract, tort, and equity combine in duty to disclose).
23. See, e.g., Baker v. Ratzlaff, 1 Kan. App. 2d 285, 564 P.2d 153 (1977).
24. See, e.g., Division of Triple T Serv., Inc. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 60 Misc. 2d 720, 304
N.Y.S.2d 191 (1969). See also Summers, supra note 8, at 252 (suggesting that section 1-203
may be inapplicable because to terminate is neither to perform nor to enforce). Another
commentator sees it as a borderline area that should be covered:
[While the socially important goal of imposing good faith standards on all actors
involved in transactions governed by the UCC indicates the desirability of treating
the words "performance" and "enforcement" broadly, obviously, the formation
and purchase aspects of contracts cannot logically be treated as matters of
performance or enforcement. Nonetheless, the grey area that lies between those
aspects and the "pure" performance ... or enforcement ... aspects of the
contract [including termination of dealership contracts] should not be left without
good faith protection.
1 W. HAwXLAND, UNIoM COMMERCIAL CODE SERIFS § 1-203:01, at 157 (1984).
25. E.g., Baker, 564 P.2d 153; Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Razumic, 480 Pa. 366, 378-81,
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obligations, including the obligation of good faith, the contract remains in
effect at the time the clause is exercised. 26 Exercise of the termination clause
is a necessary incident to the enforcement of that substantive right of the
contract27 and as such is subject to the requirement of good faith.
Because calling a note is inseparable from enforcing the maker's duty to
pay, the holder is constrained by the requirements of good faith in making
a call. The maker of a note contractually "engages that he wil pay the
instrument according to its tenor at the time of his engagement . ... "28
As the Centerre court stresses,29 a cause of action against a maker accrues
on a demand note upon its date or, if no date is stated, on the date of
issue. 0 The holder of a note in demand form thus has the discretion of
390 A.2d 736, 742-44 (1978). See generally 3 BENDER'S UNORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERVICE
§ 4.08[3], at 4-262 to 4-263 (R. Duesenberg & L King 1988) ("It is doubtful that most courts
would regard the concept of good faith to be inapplicable to the exercise of a termination
clause .... "). Several courts have determined properly that the good faith obligation does
not operate like the unconscionability provision of section 2-302 in allowing a court to override
or strike express contract terms. See Grand Light & Supply Co. v. Honeywell, Inc., 771 F.2d
672 (2d Cir. 1985); Corenswet, Inc. v. Amana Refrigeration, 594 F.2d 129 (5th Cir. 1979).
Courts have had difficulties in applying the good faith standard, however. Although the refusal
to limit termination "at will" cases to termination for good cause has been proper, see, e.g.,
Smith v. Price's Creameries, 98 N.M. 541, 650 P.2d 825 (1982), the courts go too far in
suggesting that all motives in terminating are irrelevant, see, e.g., Blalock Mach. & Equip.
Co. v. Iowa Mfg. Co., 576 F. Supp. 774 (N.D. Ga. 1983); Smith, 650 P.2d 825. Terminations
induced by dishonest motives would violate the good faith standard as codified. See infra
notes 48-50 and accompanying text. For discussion of judicial application of the good faith
standard to franchise agreements, see Gellhorn, Limitations on Contract Termination Rights-
Franchise Cancellations, 1967 DUKE L.J. 465; Hewitt, Good Faith or Unconscionability-
Franchise Remedies for Termination, 29 Bus. LAW. 227 (1973).
26. This observation responds directly to the concern expressed by the court in Division
of Triple T Service, 60 Misc. 2d 720, 304 N.Y.S.2d 191. The court denied the applicability of
the Code good faith standard to the exercise of a termination clause on the grounds that the
standard "merely relates to the honesty imposed upon the parties during the term of the
contract .... " Id. at 201 (emphasis in original).
27. "Enforcement" in this context includes more than invoking the aid of the courts to
compel observance or relief for breach. The exercise of the discretionary substantive right is
enforced by invoking it to make it effective. The Uniform Commercial Code defines "action":
" 'Action' in the sense of a judicial proceeding includes recoupment, counterclaim, set-off,
suit in equity and any other proceedings in which rights are determined." U.C.C. § 1-201(1)
(1978). Nothing in the statutory language or the Comment to section 1-203 limits the obligation
of good faith enforcement to cases in which one of the parties brings an action. Additional
illustrations of nonjudicial enforcement include a bank's right to set off and a secured lender's
right to take possession of collateral following a default by the debtor.
28. U.C.C. § 3-413(1) (1978).
29. Centerre, 705 S.W.2d at 47.
30. An "action may be brought on a demand note immediately upon issue, without
demand, since presentment is not required to charge the maker .... ." U.C.C. § 3-122 comment
1 (1978). See also Master Homecraft Co. v. Zimmerman, 208 Pa. Super. 401, 222 A.2d 440
(1966); Mandola v. Oggero, 508 S.W.2d 861 (rex. Civ. App. 1974). "The cause of action
accrues on the date of the instrument rather than upon dishonor so as to deprive the holder
of the ability to delay the running of the statute of limitations by delaying presentment of the
instrument." 4 W. HAwxLAND, UIFORM COM RCIAL CODE SERIS § 3-122:03 (W. Hawkland
& L. Lawrence 1984).
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determining when that payment must be made. What the Centerre court
overlooks, however, is that the holder must either call the note or bring a
cause of action in order to place the maker in default.3' The call of a
demand instrument thus constitutes the lender's enforcement of the borrow-
er's duty to pay, and it consequently is subject to the obligation of good
faith.
The Centerre court also relied upon and adopted the reasoning advanced
by a Georgia appellate court in Fulton National Bank v. Willis Denny Ford,
Inc.3 2 Both opinions take the position that the application of section 1-203
would add a term to the contract that the parties themselves had not
included. Since the parties did not expressly include a good faith limitation,
the courts professed an unwillingness to rewrite the agreements. 3
Both courts misunderstand the source of the good faith obligation. In
construing section 1-203, they quote a commentator who suggests that the
section "in effect states that what is not regulated by the contract should
be done in such a way as to show good faith in the carrying out of what
is expressed." ' 34 In reality, the good faith obligation is a basic principle
reaching "the performance and enforcement of all agreements or duties. ' 35
The obligation arises by law in any contract within the scope of the U.C.C.,36
31. "[I]t is clear that there is no default [on a note] until after demand by the holder
. .U.C.C. § 3-122 comment 2 (1978). As Hart and Willier point out:
As the term [demand instrument] applies to the maker of a note, it is somewhat
anomalous since no demand need be made by the holder.... The holder usually
does make demand, however, since it would be foolish for him to start a lawsuit
if he is in fact going to be paid.
F. Hart & W. Willier, supra note 5, § 5.0212], at 5-8 to 5-11. Furthermore, as McDonnell
states, "The rules of Section 3-122 do not by their terms directly fix liability. They are in a
sense secondary in that they have an impact on judgments only in combination with other
doctrines." McDonnell, supra note 5, at 42.
32. 154 Ga. App. 846, 269 S.E.2d 916 (1980). The Centerre court also cited a Washington
opinion for its conclusory statement that good faith under section 1-203 is not a factual issue
in determining the bank's right to call a demand note. See Allied Sheet Metal Fabricators,
Inc. v. Peoples Nat'l Bank, 10 Wash. App. 530, 536 n.5, 518 P.2d 734, 738 n.5, cert. denied,
419 U.S. 967 (1974).
33. Centerre, 705 S.W.2d at 48; Fulton, 269 S.E.2d at 918.
34. 1 R. ANDERsON, UNFORM CO MERCIAL CODE § 1-203:3, at 378 (3d ed. 1984). See also
F. Hart & W. Willier, supra note 5, § 5.0212], at 5-8 to 5-9 n.9.
35. U.C.C. § 1-203 comment (1978) (emphasis added).
36. U.C.C. § 1-203 (1978). As Professor Burton stated:
Good faith here [in the context of contract performance] functions to protect
the contractual expectations of the parties to a contract when one of them
exercises discretion in performance. It is a basis for the interpretation and
implication of contract terms. Bad faith performance of a contract may give rise
to liability for breach of contract.
Burton, supra note 8, at 20-21. See also Farnsworth, supra note 8, at 670, 672. (The significance
of good faith under the Code is "in implying terms in the agreement .... [T]he chief utility




and it cannot be disclaimed even by express agreement of the parties.37
While it is true that good faith is not a bar to the enforcement of a party's
legal rights even though enforcement may result in harshness to the other
party,38 the Centerre Bank and Fulton courts incorrectly assumed that good
faith is reduced to governing only the gaps in an agreement. 39 Good faith
governs the performance and enforcement of the express terms of the
agreement as well.
The Fulton court finds additional alleged support for its position in part
of the Comments to section 1-208. 40 This section governs the interpretation
of contract terms that permit a party to accelerate payment "at will" or
upon "deem[ing] himself insecure," and it requires that these words "shall
be construed to mean that he shall have power to do so only if he in good
faith believes that the prospect of payment or performance is impaired." 4'
37. U.C.C. § 1-102(3) (1978).
38. See 1 R. ANmansoN, Uuso~m Co ERciAL CODE § 1-203:11, at 381 (3d ed. 1984).
See, e.g., American Exploration Co. v. Columbia Gas Transmission Corp., 779 F.2d 310 (6th
Cir. 1985) (not breach of good faith to curtail gas purchases because of market conditions
when contract allowed restricting flow or discontinuing purchases due to changed conditions);
Missouri Public Service Co. v. Peabody Coal Co., 583 S.W.2d 721, 725 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 865 (1979) ("Where an enforceable, untainted contract exists, refusing
modification of price and seeking specific performance of valid covenants does not constitute
bad faith or breach of contract .... ).
39. Contra 1 R. ANDERsoN, UNiFoRm COMMERCIAL. CODE § 1-203:17, at 385 (3d ed. 1984)
("The concept of good faith plays only a limited role in the field of commercial paper because
of the basic principle that the enforcing of contract terms is not to be regarded as acting in
bad faith . . . ."). Professor Burton's analysis of good faith is a much more useful approach.
The courts generally have construed the good faith performance obligation as a
limitation on discretion in performance. They generally use good faith in this
context to mean that a discretion-exercising party rightfully may deprive the other
of its anticipated benefits for any purpose that was within the reasonable
contemplation of the parties at formation. The benefit perspective-focusing on
whether the dependent party received the "fruits" of the contract-is inadequate
because it fails to recognize that the discretion-exeicising party may have withheld
them rightfully. However, the courts have held that such a party breaches the
contract by performing in bad faith when the facts indicate that discretion was
used to recapture opportunities forgone upon contracting-that the discretion-
exercising party refused to pay the expected costs of performance. Such behavior
is wrongful because it necessarily harms the dependent party's contractual expec-
tation interest.
Burton, supra note 8, at 5-6 (emphasis added). For his analysis in the common law context,
see Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good Faith, 94
HARv. L. RaY. 369 (1980). But cf. Summers, supra note 17, at 830-34 (criticism of Professor
Burton's analysis).
40. For a critical analysis of section 1-208, see Note, Standards for Insecurity Acceleration
Under Section 1-208 of the Uniform Commercial Code: A Proposal for Reform, 13 U. MICH.
J.L. REP. 623 (1980).
41. Section 1-208 provides:
A term providing that one party or his successor in interest may accelerate
payment or performance or require collateral or additional collateral "at will"
or "when he deems himself insecure" or in words of similar import shall be
construed to mean that he shall have power to do so only if he in good faith
1988]
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The Comment properly states: "Obviously this section has no application
to demand instruments or obligations whose very nature permits call at any
time with or without reason."42 The Fulton court seizes upon this statement
in the Comment to strip the constraint of good faith from the call of a
demand note. 43
The Fulton court erred by applying the Comment out of context and by
reading too much into it. Under section 1-208, an "at will" acceleration
clause that is otherwise absolute on its face nevertheless can be exercised
for only one reason-a good faith belief that the prospect for payment or
performance is impaired. 4 The Comment accurately depicts the distinguish-
ing features of demand instruments: payment does not have to be accelerated
since demand instruments can be called at any time, and a holder's call of
a demand instrument is not limited statutorily to any specific reasons. The
statement in the Comment, however, does not legitimize bad faith calls of
demand notes. A holder's right to call a demand instrument includes the
section 1-203 obligation to do so only in good faith, and the Comment to
section 1-208 does not provide otherwise. 45
Unlike the Centerre and Fulton opinions, the other leading case in this
area avoids the error of denying applicability of the good faith standard to
the call of a demand note. In K.M.C. Co., Inc. v. Irving Trust Company,"
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a magistrate's jury instructions
believes that the prospect of payment or performance is impaired. The burden
of establishing lack of good faith is on the party against whom the power has
been exercised.
U.C.C. § 1-208 (1978).
42. U.C.C. § 1-208 comment (1978).
43. Fulton, 269 S.E.2d at 918-19. In Reid v. Key Nat'l Bank of Southern Me., Inc., 821
F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1987), the First Circuit Court of Appeals evaded the same issue that was
presented to the Fulton court. The First Circuit examined the loan documentation and concluded
that the inclusion of conditions and events relating to breach contradicted the alleged demand
nature of the note. Id. at 13-14. The difficulty with the court's approach is that it inferentially
suggests that the loan documents could be drafted in a way that would make the Fulton
court's analysis appropriate.
44. One court has applied section 1-208 to an acceleration based on a specific default
clause rather than the generalized insecurity acceleration clause. Brown v. Avemco Inv. Corp.,
603 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1979). The acceleration was based on a "due-on-lease" clause in a
security agreement covering an airplane. The court's application of section 1-208 was inappro-
priate and not in accord with other court opinions. See Bowen v. Muse, 114 N.J. Super. 372,
276 A.2d 397 (1971). Even default accelerations are subject to a good faith standard through
section 1-203. The imposition of section 1-208, however, would limit the opportunity to
accelerate following breach of the default provision to circumstances in which the debtor
hohestly believes that the default impairs the prospects for payment or performance by the
debtor.
45. Although it is made in the context of acceleration under a specific default clause, the
following observation is equally pertinent in the context discussed in the text. "The implication
that simply because Section 1-208 is inapplicable good faith is immaterial, should be resisted."
McDonnell, supra note 5, at 58.
46. 757 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1985).
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that the decision on whether to advance additional funds under a financing
agreement was limited by the obligation of good faith performance. 47 The
court also held that the demand feature of the financing agreement did not
alter the requirement because the power to demand repayment also is
constrained by the same good faith obligation. 4
Unfortunately, the K.M.C. court failed to rely upon section 1-203 for its
holding. Instead, the court cited section 1-208 and stated that "[t]he demand
provision is a kind of acceleration clause . . . . 49 The K.M.C. court thus
reached the correct result concerning application of the good faith standard,
but it used an incorrect Code provision.5 0
II. WHAT DOES THE GOOD FAITH STANDARD REQURE?
Once a court decides that the good faith standard applies, the court must
still determine what that standard includes. The term "good faith" is defined
in the Code to mean "honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction
concerned. ' 51 This definition creates a purely subjective standard that is
not affected by objective concerns about what a reasonable person would
do under similar circumstances. Without question, the Code definition is
overly restrictive because it precludes using the good faith requirement to
strike down many offensive, but not dishonest actions.5 2 In addition, the
purely subjective standard does not invoke the standards of fairness and
commercial reasonableness that should surround many of the transactions
arising under the Uniform Commercial Code.53
47. Id. at 759.
48. Id. at 760.
49. Id. The Comment to section 1-208, discussed supra notes 42-45 and accompanying
text, should preclude precisely this type of erroneous conclusion. But see Comment, Implied
Covenants of Good Faith and Fair Dealing: Loose Cannons of Liability for Financial
Institutions?, 40 VAND. L. Rnv. 1197, 1223 (1987) (The K.M.C. court appeared to apply a
"two-tiered analysis" using sections 1-203 and 1-208.).
50. The First Circuit correctly relied upon section 1-203 in holding that the good faith
applies to a lender's decision to terminate its secured credit arrangement with its debtors. Reid
v. Key Nat'l Bank of Southern Me., Inc., 821 F.2d 9, 12-13 (1st Cir. 1987). The court also
relied upon the K.M.C. holding. Id. at 13. An appellate court in Illinois correctly implied g
good faith standard to a lender's unilateral decision to terminate further financing under a
line-of-credit security agreement despite a clause in the loan documents that further loans were
"at bank discretion." Carrico v. Delp, 490 N.E.2d 972, 976 (Ill. App. 1986). Unfortunately,
the court did not refer to the U.C.C. at all, let alone section 1-203.
51. U.C.C. § 1-201(19) (1978).
52. Professor Summers analyzes seven separate classes of cases. Summers, supra note 8,
at 210-12. According to Professor Summers, "[t]he Code's definitions restrictively distort the
doctrine of good faith." Id. at 215.
53. "Good faith performance properly requires some objective standard tied to commercial
reasonableness." Farnsworth, supra note 8, at 671. Professor Farnsworth also states that
"[b]oth common sense and tradition dictate an objective standard for good faith performance."




The Code does include an additional definition of good faith. Article 2
provides that with respect to a merchant, "good faith" means both honesty
in fact and "the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair
dealing in the trade.'' s4 This additional definition, however, is expressly
restricted to transactions within Article 2 involving sales of goods.15 There-
fore, even though lenders could satisfy the definitional requirements of
"merchants, ' 56 the good faith definition would not applyY7 The additional
objective component of the definition of good faith in Article 2 is not
applicable on its face to transactions under Articles 3 or 9, and thus does
not govern the cases under discussion here.
Lenders would be well advised, however, not to depend upon courts using
only a subjective standard when called upon to determine the lender's good
faith obligation in the performance and enforcement of loan agreements
payable on demand. The line between subjective and objective standards
can be difficult to determine under some facts,58 and a court might be
inclined to bend that line against a lender. Also, a court might simply
ignore the applicable statutory definition and apply an objective standard. 9
The temptation to bend or ignore the statutory standard might be particu-
larly inviting in a situation involving the call of a demand loan because the
borrower is particularly vulnerable to the lender's unfettered discretion.
Therefore, a lender might find itself bound to an objective measure of good
faith either because the court completely disregards the statutory framework,
or because the court justifies its approach through an argument based upon
analogy or supplementary principles of law.
The next subsection of this Article discusses the application of the
subjective standard of good faith to the facts of the K.M.C., Centerre and
Fulton opinions. This subsection focuses on the standard as it is codified
in the U.C.C. The final subsection addresses the desirability of an objective
element of good faith in this context, how it might be achieved legitimately,
54. U.C.C. § 2-103(l)(b) (1978).
55. The preface provision of the section 2-103 definitions begins with the words "[i]n this
Article."
56. Article 2 defines "merchant" to mean "a person who deals in goods of the kind or
otherwise by his occupation holds himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the
practices or goods involved in the transaction or to whom such knowledge or skill may be
attributed by his employment of an agent or broker or other intermediary who by his occupation
holds himself out as having such knowledge or skill." U.C.C. § 2-104(1) (1978) (emphasis
added).
57. The index of definitions provision indicates that the listed definitions, including "mer-
chant" and "between merchants," apply to "this Article or to specified Parts thereof ......
U.C.C. § 2-103(2) (1978).
58. "Under a subjective test of good faith it is always open to the trier of the facts to
evaluate the credibility of a claim of 'honesty in fact,' and in doing so to take account of the
reasonableness or unreasonableness of the claim." Farnsworth, supra note 8, at 672.
59. This approach is precisely the one followed by the court in K.M.C. v. Irving Trust
Co. See infra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
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and what it portends for the future of both lender liability and commercial
law.
A. The Codified Approach
The K.M.C. court erred in the way that it rejected the subjective standard
as the appropriate measure of good faith. Spurning dishonesty as the relevant
standard, the court concluded that abuse of discretion is the proper criterion
by which to review a refusal to extend additional credit under a financing
agreement in which the loan balance is payable upon demand.60 The K.M.C.
court required "reasonableness" and "valid business judgment."',, It con-
cluded that, due to the significant impact that withdrawing financing would
have upon the borrower, "Illogically, . . . this obligation to act in good
faith would require a period of notice to K.M.C. to allow it a reasonable
opportunity to seek alternate financing, absent valid business reasons pre-
cluding [the lender] from doing so.''62 The court flatly stated its reliance
upon the objective criterion: "[T]here must at least be some objective basis
upon which a reasonable loan officer in the exercise of his discretion would
have acted in that manner." 63
In addition to embracing an objective standard for good faith without
establishing any legal support, the court misunderstood how to apply the
subjective standard. The court suggested that the evidence presented might
60. K.M.C., 757 F.2d at 760.
61. Id. at 761.
62. Id. at 759. In another case involving a lender's decision to terminate its secured line
of credit, the trial court initially instructed the jurors with both subjective and objective
standards of good faith, but upon a request for clarified instructions, formulated a purely
subjective standard. Reid v. Key Nat'l Bank of Southern Me., Inc., 821 F.2d 9, 14-15 (1st
Cir. 1987). In ruling that the evidence was sufficient to support a jury verdict against the
lender, the First Circuit nevertheless applied the same criteria as the K.M.C. court. The First
Circuit wrote:
In sum, the jury could have reasonably found that the bank acted in bad faith
in precipitously and without warning halting further advances on which it knew
Reid's business depended, in failing to make a sufficient effort to negotiate
alternative solutions to any problems it perceived in its relationship with Reid,
and in failing to give notice that it intended to terminate the relationship entirely.
Id. at 16. The court held that even if the jury did not believe the plaintiffs' allegations of
racial prejudice, it still could have found that "the bank was motivated by ulterior consider-
ations, not a good faith concern for its financial security." Id. at 15, 16. However, the court
never identified what those ulterior considerations might be.
63. Id. at 761 (emphasis in original). Another court, without any attempt to apply the
U.C.C. to the transaction, applied a purely objective standard to a lender's unilateral decision
to terminate further loans under a line-of-credit security agreement.
Good faith between contracting parties requires the party vested with contractual
discretion to exercise it reasonably, and he may not do so arbitrarily, capriciously,
or in a manner inconsistent with the reasonable expectations of the parties. We
conclude the agreement gave the bank reasonable, not absolute, discretion.
Carrico v. Delp, 490 N.E.2d 972, 976 (Ill. App. 1986) (citations omitted).
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not have been sufficient to sustain a verdict for the plaintiff-borrower under
a purely subjective standard.64 As is discussed below, however, even under
the codified subjective approach, the facts of K.M.C. suggest a strong case
of violation of the good faith obligation.
K.M.C. and Irving Trust Co. entered into a financing agreement whereby
Irving ultimately extended a line of credit for $3.5 million dollars that was
payable on demand. Irving received a security interest in all of K.M.C.'s
inventory and accounts receivable, and all of K.M.C.'s receipts were de-
posited into a "blocked account" to which Irving alone had access. Without
continued and regular financing, K.M.C. would be left without operating
capital and could not continue its operation." On March 1, 1982, Irving,
without prior notice, refused a request to advance additional funds that
would have been within the established limit. K.M.C. alleged that this
refusal breached the implied obligation of good faith performance, and
ultimately resulted in its collapse as a going concern.
The record included several facts that would constitute sufficient evidence
to justify a conclusion that Irving had not acted honestly in refusing the
additional credit, thereby breaching its obligation of good faith. Most
importantly, the court referred to competent evidence that a personality
conflict had developed between the loan officer for Irving and the president
of K.M.C. The evidence that the loan decision was motivated by a personal
vendetta supports the inference that it was not made honestly. The honesty-
in-fact standard of good faith precludes a lender from invoking a contract
right merely to avenge ill-feelings toward the borrower.
The court referred to additional evidence in the record that would support
the inference that the lender acted upon a dishonest motive. It showed that
the loan officer was aware that terminating additional financing would
destroy K.M.C. The loan officer also testified that on March 1 the lender
"was faced with a sudden crisis of unprecedented proportions. '"6 The
statement may have been an exaggeration, however, because the court found
that "there was ample evidence in the record from which the jury could
have concluded that March 1 simply was not that unusual a day in the
history of the relationship between Irving and K.M.C."' '  Further, the
evidence reported by the court showed that Irving knowingly violated its
own policy of providing advance notice before it terminates financing when
adequately secured. 68 The evidence thus showed that the loan officer pro-
ceeded in actions adverse to K.M.C. knowing that the lender's interests
were fully protected, knowing that the refusal to extend an additional loan
64. K.M.C., 757 F.2d at 761.
65. K.M.C. was a medium-sized company in the wholesale grocery business.
66. K.M.C., 757 F.2d at 762.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 761, 763.
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violated Irving's own policies, and knowing that his actions would destroy
the borrower as an operating entity. This evidence, coupled with the lender's
dislike of the borrower's president, supports an inference that the additional
loan was refused for the sole dishonest motive of injuring K.M.C. Even
under the more restrictive subjective standard, the evidence supports a
finding that the refusal to extend additional credit was a breach of the
obligation of good faith.
The facts in the Centerre opinion show some interesting parallels to the
K.M.C. case. In 1979, Centerre Bank extended a line of credit to Distrib-
utors, Inc. in exchange for a $900,000 demand note, a security interest in
inventory and accounts receivable, and the personal guaranty of the owner
and sole shareholder. By 1981, the owner had sold twenty percent of
Distributors' stock to the general manager, Dan Brown, and was considering
selling the remaining eighty percent. Brown and other members of his family
were interested in acquiring the remaining stock but were concerned about
whether the bank would continue to extend financing if the purchase went
through. The record shows that the loan officer of the bank assured Brown
that financing would continue as long as the current owner continued on
his personal guaranty.
Subsequent to the purchase of the remaining stock by the Browns, the
loan officer of the bank informed them that their personal guaranties would
be required in addition to that of the previous owner. Brown testified that
assurances were given that financing would continue if the guaranties were
produced. He admitted, however, that he was told the loan would have to
be run through the bank's committee for final approval. On August 18,
1981, Brown delivered the guaranties to the bank. Three days later, the
bank gave notice that it was calling the demand note in sixty days. Despite
this notification, between August 19, 1981 and December 15, 1981, the date
of the final call, the bank continued to extend almost $635,000 in credit to
Distributors. During this time the bank also received substantial payments
on the loan, and made several unsuccessful attempts to assist Distributors
in securing other financing. On December 24, 1981, Brown surrendered all
of the assets of Distributors to the bank.
The similarities to the K.M.C. case concern allegations that the president
of the bank did not like Brown, that the president did not think that Brown
was a good manager, and that the bank knew that calling the note would
effectively put Distributors out of business. If provable, these facts could
have been utilized to support a breach of the good faith obligation under
the codified subjective standard of good faith. The court did indicate,
however, that "[it is highly questionable that the evidence showed that the
bank intended to cause injury to Distributors, " 69 which, if correct, would
69. Centerre, 705 S.W.2d at 54.
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preclude using the codified subjective standard as a basis for proving breach
of, good faith. Interestingly, however, the court reports that Distributors
submitted these allegations in support of its claim against the bank under
a prima facie tort theory, and not on behalf of the breach of good faith
theory.
The court's report of the allegations under the good faith theory suggest
that perhaps the allegations were not pleaded specifically enough to relate
to a purely subjective standard. This observation, of course, is purely
academic in relationship to its effect on the outcome of the case, because
the appellate court ruled incorrectly that the good faith obligation was
inapplicable to the call of the demand note.70 Nevertheless, the limritations
under the subjective standard of good faith can be illustrated well through
this case.
Rather than focusing on the alleged ill-feelings between the bank president
and Brown, Distributors claimed that:
various loan officers of the Bank thought the Distributors loan was a
bankable one, the Bank failed to disclose it was concerned about the
loan and that [its president] believed the loan was the largest risk
exposure in the Bank, [the loan officer] led the Browns to believe the
Bank approved of their buying the Distributors' stock while [the presi-
dent] was preparing to call the loan, and the loan was called only three
days after the Browns delivered their personal guaranties even though
the financial situation of Distributors was improving after the Browns
purchased all of the stock.7'
These allegations are relevant to prove a breach of the subjective standard
of good faith only to the extent that they show that the bank was acting
dishonestly.
Combined with a showing of alleged ill-feelings between the bank's
president and Brown, these facts could have provided the cornerstone for
a case of dishonest enforcement of the loan by the bank. The appellate
court did shield the bank from liability on the count of misrepresentation
based upon the loan officer's assurances of continued bank approval. This
holding clearly was appropriate since the Browns knew that loan approval
had to come from a loan committee, thus establishing the lack of legitimate
reliance. The preclusion of the claim of misrepresentation is not necessarily
conclusive on an attempt to show subjective bad faith, however, because
the plaintiffs still might have been able to demonstrate an inference of the
bank's false pretenses.
Further inferences of false pretenses might stem from a showing that the
bank purposely delayed its decision to call the loan until it first secured the
personal guaranties of the Browns. The defendants would have had to
70. See supra notes 13-39 and accompanying text.
71. Centerre, 705 S.W.2d at 47.
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establish that the loan officer knew the loan was classified as a problem
loan. Alternatively, they would have had to show that the bank was not
prepared to continue with the financing but rather was poised to call the
loan upon receiving the guaranties. Under these circumstances the loan
officer would have been pretending to believe facts that he actually knew
to be otherwise. Another possibility is that the loan officer's conduct could
still satisfy the subjective standard even in the absence of such actual
knowledge if he wilfully refrained from investigating the bank's real view
of the loan. On the other hand, a negligent failure to ascertain this
information would not constitute subjective bad faith. Several months
elapsed between the initial inquiries by Brown and the delivery of the
additional guaranties. Since the loan officer indicated that the guaranties
would be required, one would assume that he would have acquired some
basis of information concerning the bank's position. Negligence in deter-
mining the accuracy of its position, or breakdowns in communications
within the bank, would fall outside the scope of a purely subjective standard
of good faith.
The reporting of the Centerre case, and the failure even to apply the
good faith standard to the facts, make it impossible to ascertain whether a
pure honesty-in-fact standard was possible or even attempted. The Centerre
case nevertheless demonstrates that the limited subjective standard can make
violations of the good faith obligation in the call of a demand instrument
very difficult to prove. Plaintiffs must base their cases not only upon events
that occur exclusively within the internal structure of the lender, but also
upon the mental motivations affecting those events. Even skillful use of
discovery will not be adequate in many instances to develop this latter type
of evidence. Lenders will stress objective factors of the transaction that
appear to legitimize their decision, as the Centerre Bank did72 and as Irving
Trust feebly attempted to do. 73 Furthermore, prudent lending institutions
will assume a more professional posture than Irving Trust and Centerre
Bank did by guarding against any overt manifestations of personality
conflicts with personnel of the borrower.
Although the Fulton case is criticized along with the Centerre opinion in
the first part of this Article because it did not recognize the applicability
of the good faith obligation, 74 the reported facts of Fulton do not suggest
any plausible grounds for a violation of the good faith obligation. The
automobile dealer that had borrowed the money, giving demand notes
pursuant to a floor planning arrangement, was "out of trust" in excess of
$180,000 from having failed to remit the proceeds of fifty-six sales of
72. Id. at 49-50, 54.
73. K.M.C., 757 F.2d at 762.
74. See supra notes 32-45 and accompanying text.
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automobiles subject to the agreement. The bank's subsequent examination
of the dealer's books and records revealed several additional reasons for
legitimate concern: "improper record entries, questionable tax deductions,
use of corporate funds for personal expenses, payment of salaries deemed
'excessive' to [the dealer's] relatives who were employed by [the dealership],
and a significant drop in car sales from November 1973 to February 1974." 75
The dealer then refused to agree to proposed changes to avoid another "out
of trust" situation. Despite the bank's refusal to extend any additional
financing for new cars, it did agree to extensions on payment of all of the
outstanding notes until the dealer was able to establish a floor planning
arrangement through Ford Motor Credit Company.
The bank in Fulton thus appears to have proceeded for completely
legitimate reasons, without any indications of false pretenses or ulterior
motives. On the other hand, the court does not report what facts concerning
alleged bad faith were presented by the plaintiff-dealer in opposition to the
bank's motion for summary judgment. It is impossible, therefore, to ascer-
tain whether the plaintiff presented a claim even relevant to the subjective
standard. To decide the case properly, the court should have held first that
the good faith obligation applied to the call of the demand notes. Then,
depending upon the evidence presented, the court should have found either
that the plaintiff did not allege adequate material facts to raise a genuine
issue of good faith to preclude granting the motion for summary judgement,
or that the allegations were sufficient to cause the case to be remanded for
trial on that issue.
B. Beyond the Codified Approach
The K.M.C. case vividly demonstrates that some courts, despite the
limitations of the codified definition of good faith, are prepared to inject
an objective component into the lender's good faith obligation in a financing
decision on loans with a demand feature. Extending the good faith require-
ment into the objective sphere seems appropriate in this context.76 Unlike
the approach in K.M.C., however, courts addressing these lending decisions
75. Fulton, 269 S.E.2d at 917.
76. As one commentator has statd:
Nor should we neglect the fact that the Code elevates into overriding principles
such concepts as good faith, unconscionability, and commercial reasonable-
ness.... Karl Llewellyn's best legacy to us may have been that, against powerful
opposition, he succeeded in keeping his Code open-ended. Good faith and the
like are words to conjure with, whenever we feel like conjuring.
Gilmore, The Good Faith Purchase Idea and the Uniform Commercial Code: Confessions of
a Repentant Draftsman, 51 GA. L. Rv. 605, 629 (1981). A contrary position is indicated in
Ebke & Griffin, Lender Liability to Debtors: Toward a Conceptual Framework, 40 Sw. L.J.
775, 798 (1986) ("[Tlhe actionable theory of good faith and fair dealing is too broad and
inconcrete to serve as a basis of lender liability, as no workable limits to liability exist.").
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in the future should develop a suitable analogy or statutory construction to
justify their decisions.
One desirable approach would be to apply by analogy the objective
standard of good faith performance of sales contracts by merchants. The
words "argument by analogy" cannot magically dispense with the statutory
language that limits the objective standard of good faith to Article 2
transactions involving merchants." Proponents of analogies must formulate
a rationale to demonstrate the appropriateness of the proposed analogy. In
this case, the formulation is even more difficult because, rather than
justifying the application of a Code concept to a transaction outside the
scope of the Code, it applies a Code definition beyond its codified scope.
Nevertheless, combined principles of analogy and statutory construction
create persuasive arguments in this area.
A lender's performance and enforcement of a loan agreement subject to
the lender's discretion to call is sufficiently analogous to a merchant's
performance and enforcement of a sales contract to support the integration
of the objective standard to the lender's good faith obligation. The com-
mercial settings of the two types of transactions are similar. The reason for
limiting the objective requirement of good faith to merchants is obvious:
since the standard requires "the observance of reasonable commercial stan-
dards of fair dealing within the trade, ' 78 it applies only within a trade
context in which reasonable commercial standards exist. Similar reasons,
however, do not justify restricting this requirement only to merchants
engaged in sales transactions. Lending and financing institutions also hold
themselves out as professionals in commercial transactions. 79 The proposition
that they should not be held to observe reasonable commercial standards
of fair dealing within the lending and financing trade is untenable. To the
extent that such standards exist within the requisite trade, the same policies
that support their required observance by merchants apply with equal force
to lenders and other financing enterprises.
The three cases discussed in this Article provide insights into the com-
mercial standards lenders follow in exercising their discretion to call demand
obligations.80 The K.M.C. opinion states that both the manager of secured
lending activities of Irving Trust, and the president of another bank parti-
cipating with Irving Trust in the financing agreement, testified that a bank
owes its clients a duty of good faith. Furthermore, they both testified that
the duty would be violated by terminating the financing without prior notice
77. U.C.C. § 2-103(I)(b) (1978).
78. U.C.C. § 2-103(I)0o) (1978).
79. Even the definition of "merchant" is broad enough to encompass lending and financial
institutions: "a person who ... by his occupation holds himself out as having knowledge or
skill peculiar to the practices ... involved in the transaction ... ." U.C.C. § 2-104(1) (1978).
80. See also In re Red Cedar Constr. Co., 63 Bankr. 228, 238 (W.D. Mich. 1986).
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or by terminating under any circumstances when the bank is fully secured. 81
The bank in Centerre in fact did provide an advance notice period of
several months, during which time it loaned additional funds and sought
alternative financing for the borrower.82 Similarly, the bank in Fulton gave
prior notice and extended the outstanding loans during the interim period."3
The banks in each of these cases thus recognized the existence of a
commercial standard to at least provide advance notice before calling a
demand note or refusing additional credit under a security agreement callable
upon demand. The call feature in these transactions between lenders and
borrowers is a power granted to the lender under the terms of the lending
agreement. The discretion granted to the lender should not include the
opportunity to abuse that power. In this sense, the K.M.C. court is right
in concluding that the abuse of discretion standard is the "correct" one to
apply in this instance. The court, however, ignored the legal support for
its position. That support can be found in the analogous principle of holding
merchants in sales transactions to an objective component of good faith.
An obvious objection to the proposed technique of applying the Article
2 concepts of "merchant" and "good faith" beyond the confines of that
single article is that it conflicts with the apparent intention of the drafters.
The codification scheme of the U.C.C. appears to present a carefully
bifurcated drafting of the good faith concept, which arguably demonstrates
an intent to restrict the objective element of good faith only to transactions
within the scope of Article 2. These appearances are deceiving, however.
An analysis of the codification history leading to the current definitional
scheme simply does not support such an inference.85
81. K.M.C., 757 F.2d. at 761-62. The president of another bank found liable for terminating
the secured financing of its customer testified in a similar vein. "The bank's president testified
that it was customary before cutting off a customer's line of credit to send notices in advance
and call the customer to the bank for discussion." Reid v. Key Nat'l Bank of Southern Me.,
Inc., 821 F.2d 9, 15 (1st Cir. 1987).
82. Centerre, 705 S.W.2d at 46.
83. Fulton, 269 S.E.2d at 917. The testimony of bank officials and their actions in these
lender liability cases, supra notes 81-82, provide a strong refutation to the following position:
[Tihe duty of good faith, by its very nature, provides no objectively identifiable
guidelines concerning the bounds of legally permissable conduct. The duty of
good faith and fair dealing simply instructs the lender that "it is right to do
right." Yet, in commercial affairs such a mandate is, without further delineation,
formless and inconsistent with the basic notion of fairness that notice be given
as to what activities are legally permitted or prohibited.
Ebke & Griffin, supra note 68, at 798. The refutation applies also to the student commentator
who contends that an advance notice obligation was never contemplated between the parties
in K.M.C. See Comment, Lender Liability for Breach of the Obligation of Good Faith
Performance, 36 EMORY L.J. 917, 933, 966-67 (1987).
84. K.M.C., 757 F.2d at 760.
85. See generally Braucher, The Legislative History of the Uniform Commercial Code, 58
COLTuM. L. REv. 798 (1958).
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Originally the Code had only a general definition of good faith, and it
included an objective as well as a subjective element. 6 The drafters focused
foremost on good faith in purchase contexts, particularly the purchase of
negotiable instruments.Y The "subjective vs. objective" controversy had
raged for decades in the purchaser context," and the drafters continued
within that perspective.
The ABA Section objected to the inclusion of the objective test on the
grounds that it did not accord with precedent, 9 and it might tend to freeze
commercial practices.90 In a spirit of compromise, the Code drafters limited
the general definition to its current "honesty in fact" language and added
objective tests in several specific provisions of the Code. The latter provisions
included section 2-103 and section 3-302. Section 2-103 defined good faith
for merchants as including the observance of reasonable commercial stan-
dards.91 Section 3-302 required that in order to attain the status of holder
in due course of commercial paper, the holder must take "in good faith
86. A draft of the good faith provision stated:
"Good faith" means honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned.
Good faith includes good faith toward all prior parties and observance by a
person of the reasonable commercial standards of any business or trade in which
he is engaged.
U.C.C. § 1-201(16) (May 1949 Draft).
87. Summers, supra note 8, at 208. As Professor Summers stated:
In the early drafts, Karl N. Llewellyn, the chief draftsman of the Code, had the
purchase context very much at the forefront of his mind in drafting good faith
definitions. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 10, Comment (1948 Draft). No doubt many other
scholars of commercial law were, at this time, thinking in the same vein. For
example, one author stated: "In its customary setting in problems of bona fide
purchase, a concept such as 'good faith' is necessary, and reasonably workable."
Honnold, Buyer's Right of Rejection, 97 U. PA. L. Ray. 457, 475 (1949).
Id. at 208 n.53. Professor Summers continued and stated:
Of course, the draftsmen doubtless recognized that this definition controlled the
meaning of good faith not only in sections of article 3 on holders in due course,
but also in section 1-203, imposing a general Code obligation of good faith, and
in other specific sections of article 2 using these words. But what will suffice in
the purchase context should suffice in others as well. Good faith is good faith,
or so the draftsmen seem to have thought.
Id. at 208.
88. Id. at 208 (collecting authorities).
89. This attention to good faith purchase, to the exclusion of good faith performance,
seems to have led to two general misconceptions: First, that good faith referred
only to purchase; and second, that the proper test of good faith was always
subjective. The uniform acts that preceded the Code contain upwards of fifty
references to good faith, and not once is that term used in the sense of good
faith performance. A subjective test of "honesty in fact" is used consistently
throughout the uniform acts.
Farnsworth, supra note 8, at 670-71.
90. Malcolm, The Proposed Commercial Code, 6 Bus. LAw. 113, 128 (1951) (report by
the Chairman of the Committee on the Proposed Commercial Code of the Section on
Corporation, Banking and Business Law of the American Bar Association).




including observance of the reasonable commercial standards of any business
in which the holder may be engaged." 92
Debate before the influential New York Law Revision Commission led
to further changes. Once again, the primary focus appears to have been
directed toward good faith in the purchaser context of commercial paper. 93
The reference to reasonable commercial standards was deleted, 94 with ap-
proval of the New York Commission,95 from the definition of holder in
due course. 96
Arguably, the ultimate intent of the drafters was to exclude the objective
element of good faith from the purchaser context and to limit its application
in performance and enforcement contexts to trade settings with recognized
reasonable commercial practices. 97 The drafters' excessive focus on the
purchaser context unfortunately led to a drafting approach that is inadequate
to implement these intentions fully.98 Nonetheless, the codification history
certainly does not support the conclusion that the drafters intended to
preclude an objective standard of good faith to the enforcement of profes-
sional lending transactions even when these lenders acknowledge established
reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing. Recognizing the single-
minded purpose leading the drafters to modify the definitional approach to
good faith, and lacking indications that the drafters intended to free
92. Id. § 3-302(l)(b).
93. "The provision as to holders in due course was perhaps the item most vigorously
discussed in the New York hearing." Braucher, supra note 76, at 813 (citing 1954 N.Y. REPORT
203-06, 213-40, 241-43, 424-26).
[Glood faith purchase rather than good faith performance continued to hold the
spotlight. The emasculation of the general obligation of good faith occasioned
far less controversy than did the insertion of some of the discarded language in
Article 3 on Commercial Paper.
Farnsworth, supra note 8, at 674.
94. Uniform Commercial Code, 1953 Official Draft of Text and Comments (Supp. No. I,
1955). See also id. § 7-501(4).
95. 1956 N.Y. LAW RE ISION Comm'N REP. 17, 29.
96. On good faith purchase, see Gilmore, The Commercial Doctrine of Good Faith
Purchaser, 63 YALE L.J. 1057 (1954).
97. "[N]egotiable instruments-minded lawyers could be expected to assume that the sole
effect of lopping off the reasonableness half of the 1949 definition was merely to 'make
negligence irrelevant to good faith.' " Summers, supra note 8, at 211. For support, Professor
Summers cites the following statement by Professor Braucher: "Section 1-201(19) defines 'good
faith' as 'honesty in fact,' and thus follows a number of the uniform commercial acts in
making negligence irrelevant to good faith." Id. (citing Braucher, supra note 85, at 812).
Professor Summers argues persuasively that the cases in one major category seem to have
"escaped the notice of nearly everyone." Summers, supra note 8, at 211. The class of cases
involves "forms of bad faith that do not involve dishonesty, let alone negligence-for example,
openly abusing the power to break off negotiations, openly taking unfair advantage of
bargaining power, openly acting capriciously or openly undercutting another's performance."
Id. at 210.
98. As Professor Burton stated: "They [the Code definitions of good faith] may play an
important role in the good faith purchase cases for which they were designed, but seem
irrelevant to good faith performance for all practical purposes." Burton, supra note 8, at 18.
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professional lenders from established standards of fair dealing within their
trade,9 courts today might very well be convinced to apply an objective
component to the good faith obligation of lenders.
Additional techniques could be utilized by a court to justify extending
the objective good faith standard into contract performance and enforcement
under Articles 3 and 9. A direct method would be to avoid the restrictive
definition of good faith through the language that prefaces it. The general
Code definitions apply "unless the context otherwise requires."'1° The
existence of recognized commercial standards governing the exercise of
discretion to call demand instruments' 01 might persuade a court that it has
an appropriate context for deviation from the general definition. 102 The
position might be bolstered with reference to the provision in the Comment
to the general obligation of good faith that indicates that the obligation is
"further implemented by Section 1-205 on course of dealing and usage of
trade."103 Arguably, the context requires the additional inclusion of an
objective component, rather than just the overly-restrictive general definition
of good faith, when usage of trade has established reasonable commercial
standards of fair dealing. 0 4
Alternatively, a court might rely on section 1-103 which allows judges to
utilize supplementary general principles of law and equity. 05 Examples of
bad faith can be found in a number of different case-law contexts. An
innovative court might be willing to extend into the lender context any of
a number of these types of bad faith, including evasion of the spirit of the
deal, abuse of power to specify contract terms, conjuring up a dispute,
99. But cf. Van Bibber v. Norris, 419 N.E.2d 115, 122 (Ind. 1981). In Van Bibber, the
court stated:
We note, however, that the absence of a similar burden of observing "reasonable
commercial standards" on a secured party reflects the code drafters' recognition
that sales transactions are more amenable to establishment of "reasonable com-
mercial standards" than are the relations between secured parties and debtors.
Id.
100. U.C.C. § 1-201 (1978) (preamble language).
101. See supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
102. Courts can be reluctant to invoke the "unless the context otherwise requires" language
since it easily could be used so frequently as to itself become the rule rather than the exception.
See Summers, supra note 8, at 213-15.
103. U.C.C. § 1-203 comment (1978).
104. But cf. Farnsworth, supra note 8, at 676-77 ("Where the general obligation of good'
faith requires only 'honesty in fact' it is difficult to see how- it could be meaningfully
'implemented' by course of dealing or usage of trade .....
105. Section 1-103 provides:
Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this Act, the principles of law
and equity, including the law merchant and the law relative to capacity to
contract, principal and agent, estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion,





taking advantage of another to get a favorable readjustment, and abuse of
a power to terminate. 1°6 Application of supplementary principles is inappro-
priate when they have been displaced by particular provisions of the Code. °7
However, the legislative history showing that the drafters did not focus on
good faith performance and enforcement in this context °10 can be used to
argue that these basic principles have not been displaced by Code provisions.
Courts desiring to apply an objective element to the good faith require-
ment as it applies to lenders calling demand instruments thus have a variety
of alternative rationales available. One hopes that courts embracing the
objective element will make the effort to justify their approaches through
these techniques of analogy and statutory construction. °9 The benefits will
extend beyond the improvement of individual decisions in this area. These
cases raise the issue of application of the good faith standard to Articles 3
and 9 in an enforcement, rather than a purchaser context. They have the
potential to serve as a catalyst to draw even greater attention to the proper
role of good faith performance and enforcement outside of Article 2.110
CONCLUSION
Problems with the good faith standard in the Uniform Commercial Code
were recognized soon after its codification. One commentator even referred
to good faith performance as "one of the major casualties during the
drafting of the Code." '' However, courts and commentators have only
recently begun to address on any extensive scale the concept of good faith
performance and enforcement for Code sections beyond the scope of Article
2. The- same codification problems plague these applications.
106. The identification and discussion of these categories, among others, are provided in
Summers, supra note 8, at 234-52. See also REsTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTs § 205 (1981)
("Every contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its
performance and its enforcement."). The comment to the section emphasizes that the duty
invokes an objective as well as a subjective standard. One of the specific violations of good
faith in enforcement noted in the Comment is "abuse of a power to determine compliance or
to terminate the contract." Id. comment e.
107. U.C.C. § 1-103 (1978).
108. See supra notes 86-99 and accompanying text.
109. For a contrary position, see Note, K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co.: Discretionary
Financing and the Implied Duty of Good Faith, 81 Nw. U. L. REv. 539, 563-67 (1987) (courts
should apply only the subjective standard to reflect statutory language and intent of the
drafters).
110. The courts have been called- upon to decide increasing challenges of bad faith action
in the lending area. See, e.g., 999 Corp. v. C.I.T. Corp., 776 F.2d 866 (9th Cir. 1985)
(unilateral addition of prepayment penalty to financing agreement); United States v. Cain, 736
F.2d 1195 (7th Cir. 1984) (release of collateral without notice to guarantor); Layne v. Fort
Carson Nat'l Bank, 655 P.2d 856 (Colo. App. 1982) (acceleration following default); Van
Bibber v. Norris, 419 N.E.2d 115 (Ind. 1981) (repossession of collateral without prior notice);
Todsen v. Runge, 211 Neb. 226, 318 N.W.2d 88 (1982) (taking security interest while aware
of prior unperfected security interest in the same collateral).
111. Farnsworth, supra note 8, at 673.
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Recent litigation concerning good faith in the call of demand notes and
the refusal to extend additional financing under a demand loan amply
demonstrates the difficulties. Several courts have failed even to recognize
the applicability of the good faith obligation to these cases. The few courts
that have applied the standard have done so outside of the codified scheme
of the concept without any attempts to establish a justifiable basis for their
approaches. This litigation record suggests fundamental needs both to
develop understanding concerning the scope of good faith performance and
enforcement within the Code and to utilize principles of analogy and
statutory construction to break beyond the restrictive bonds of the codified
definition of good faith.
These codification problems and their current impact on issues of lender
liability also provide some timely lessons for the emerging efforts to recodify
commercial law. A committee of the Permanent Editorial Board of the
Uniform Commercial Code already is preparing revisions for Articles 3 and
4,112 and interest in revising Article 2 is mounting.'1 3 One hopes that the
recent litigation involving lender liability issues premised on the good faith
obligation will draw the committee's attention to the role of good faith in
Article 3, particularly in the areas of performance and enforcement as well
as the purchaser contexts. Each committee seeking to recodify individual
articles of the Code also should admonish itself to guard against focusing
only on single contexts of pervasive concepts. The good faith obligation
cuts across the lines of individual sections and articles, and the failure of
the drafting committee to appreciate that pervasiveness inevitably will lead
to inadequate codification efforts. Perpetuation of the known drafting errors
of the past would be inexcusable.
112. The project is directed toward modernizing revisions of Articles 3 and 4 and the
addition of specific types of electronic funds transfer payment systems. Mooney, supra note
7, at 1354. For the background leading to this project, see Brandel, Payment Systems Law
Moves in New Directions, THE Bus. LAW. UPDATE, July-Aug. 1985, at 5, col. 1.
113. "The Subcommittee on General Provisions, Sales, Bulk Transfers and Documents of
Title, Committee on Uniform Commercial Code, is now thoroughly reviewing U.C.C. art. 2
and nonuniform amendments to it." Mooney, supra note 7, at 1355 n.73. In somewhat related
activities, a proposed final draft for Article 2A, covering leases of personal property, has been
promulgated. American Law Institute, Article 2A Leases (proposed final draft) (Apr. 6, 1987).
A drafting committee also is revising Article 6 on bulk sales. Mooney, supra note 7, at 1354.
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